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"PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW"*-A Dual Review**
Jerome Hallf and Karl Menningerl

A Lawyer's Viewpoint
The impact of psychiatry on twentieth century Americans, involving,
as it does, basic attitudes toward life, psychologies of human nature,
and the reform of legal institutions, must challenge thoughtful persons
to take stock of the situation. The requisite analysis is not the subject of this paper, but the principal lines of a relevant inquiry can
be suggested. On the one hand, it must be recognized that psychiatry
has probed deeply into the instinctual and emotional aspects of personality, and that it can exhibit hidden drives, conflicts, and mental
disorders which should be considered in any careful estimate of human
conduct. On the other hand, the theses that the life of every person
is molded in an infancy dominated by the Oedipus complex, that all
conduct is rigorously determined by antecedent experiences, mostly
instinctual, that moral obligation is merely a rationalized false pretense, and so on -these
can certainly not be accepted as scientific
truths even if very loose criteria are employed.' And if it be granted
that they are defensible premises within the confines of a clinic,
does it follow that they are also applicable or even relevant to the
types of conduct and the issues which are met in legal problems?
These broad inquiries permeate the special problems to be discussed
concerning Psychiatry and the Law, and one cannot be confident that
he has even raised the correct questions until the philosophy of the
various psychiatries has been distinguished from the empirical knowledge contributed by them.
* PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw. By Manfred S. Guttmacher and Henry Weihofen.
W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1952. Pp. viii, 461. $7.50. Doctor Guttnaeher

New York:

is Chief Medical Officer, Supreme Bench of Baltimore. Professor Weihofen is Professor of Law, University of New Mexico.
** Editor's Note: Because of the apparent significance of Psyohiatry ad the
Law, the Iowa Law Beviel is here publishing reviews by recognized experts in the
fields of criminal law and psychiatry. In preparing their reviews of Psychiatry and
the law, Professor Hall and Doctor Menninger were advised that they had "relatively unlimited freedom to discuss the book and set forth [their] own thoughts regarding its subject." Both reviewers prepared their manuscripts and submitted
them independently for publication.
t Professor of Law, Indiana University.
t Chief of Staff, The Menninger Clinic, Topeka, Kansas.
1 See the references to the studies cited in SALTER, THE CASE AGAINST PSYCHOANALYSIS 159-179 (1952).
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The Guttmacher-Weihofen book represents successful collaboration
between representatives of the two indicated disciplines. 2 It marks
important progress in forensic psychiatry, which is recent and much
needed. When the writer surveyed the field in 1945, 3 an unmitigated
strident abuse of law, lawyers, and judges characterized the forensic
forays of psychiatrists in this country.4 The situation today, evidenced
by the Guttmacher-Weihofen book, is vastly improved. There are occasional recurrences of the former bias,5 but such lapses are rare, and
they are more than compensated for by the authors' informed attitude
and approach. 6
The first third of the book consists of a simple exposition of mental
disorders, illustrated by brief ease-histories. It covers the psychoneuroses,
the manic-depressive and schizophrenic psychoses, psychopaths, sex
offenders, organic brain disorders, and congenital intellectual deficiency. This part of the book provides an interesting introduction to
theories of psychiatry, mostly Freudian. It is not sufficiently detailed
2 It is a much better contribution to forensic psychiatry than A x&ER AND
STAUB, THE Cium-IAL, THE JUDGE, AND THE PUBIc (Zilboorg, trans. 1931), whieh

was also the joint work of a psychiatrist and a lawyer.
3Hall, Menta Diecase and Criminal 1Respon b ility, 45 COL. L. REv. 677 (1945),
reprinted with revisions in the writer's GENERAL PRINcIPLES O CRIrIAL LAw- C.

14 (1947).
4 Id. and of. the writing of Dr. Norwood East, a distinguished English psychiatrist
with over forty years' experience in legal and penological problems, especially his
SocrLy AND THE CRImmmA (London 1949, Springfield, I1. 1951). A typical statement by Dr. East is: "But a measure of emotional insight is essential for the
clinical work of a physician, whose main purpose is to comfort and cure. Hence,
almost inevitably, his approach to medico-legal problems is less free from bias as
a rule than is the intellectual impersonality of the lawyer, or the detached disposition
of the exact scientist." Id. at 213.
It seems probable that the opinions of psychiatrists in this country have been
influenced by American attitudes regarding lawyers, as contrasted with the high
prestige of the English bar, and by adverse views of law in central and eastern
Europe, shown, e.g., in ALzxANvDn AND STAUB, op. cit. supra note 2 at 15-16.
Other opinions by Dr. East, which are important for the present inquiry, Rre
summarized in his above cited book on pages 8,16, 18, 19, 49, 51, 53, 223-4, 265,
268-9, 273.
5 "The
criminal law stands as the relentless dispenser of punitive sanctions, while
permissiveness and forbearance permeate psychiatric thinking."

(4)

".

. . our

present antiquated legal structure, ...2 (81) "It takes rigorous legal training
to develop a tolerance for this sort of word-magic." (423).
a E.g., their noting that" "the law ... is itself a subtreasury of time-tested
psychology, most of it quite sound" (12); their refutation of criticism of law and
courts by psychiatrists who do not understand the relevant legal problems (12, 210) ;
and their recommendation that the medical schools should include instruction "by
lawyers, judges, and psychiatrists experienced in medicolegal work.12 (221).
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to serve specialized needs; and there is often little more than a description of an underprivileged family background and a persistent
criminal career. However, as to the disposition of cases and sentence,
there is merit in the authors' suggestion that "psychiatry can make
its greatest contribution to criminal justice at this point." 7 Then follow chapters on the psychiatrist as an expert witness, privileged communication, veracity, hospitalizing the mentally ill, and the effect of
mental incompetency on guardianship, contracts, wills, marriage, and
tort liability. Succeeding chapters deal with mental disorder in relation
to criminal responsibility, and the book concludes with a plea for
prevention and reform.
Although the book is an important forward step in forensic psychiatry, it does not provide an adequate analysis of certain basic problems, e.g., the differences between legal functions and those of psychiatrists, and the relationship between certain legal rules and psychiatry.
What still needs emphasis and clarification is that litigation is a dispute
involving precious rights and values as well as sharp disagreements
among reputable psychiatrists, the implications of which are not resolved by authority, i.e., official appointment of the experts. The problem, moreover, is obscured when the knowledge represented in law
and its administration is opposed to psychiatric or other empirical
knowledge ;8 actually, it represents the testing and adaptation of psychiatry and other empirical knowledge to the solution of legal problems, even though there is an inevitable lag behind the vanguard of
science. Especially with reference to a discipline like psychology, the
correct formulation of problems requires recognition of the fact that
a vast amount of such knowledge has been incorporated into and tested
by the legal process.' The authors' acknowledgment of this 0 is in gratifying contrast to the recently prevailing attitude among psychiatrists
who wrote about law. What needs to be done, however, is to follow the
implications through the investigation of problems and the assessment of claims of the various psychologies to superior knowledge. The
neutral formulation of problems in that perspective, a critique of the
psychology now used in law, and the clarification of legal functions as
7p. 265.
8 This general problem has recently been discussed by the writer in Some Basic
Questions Regarding Legal Classification for Professional and Scientific Purposes,
5 J. OF LEG. ED. 329 (1953).

9 "Dealing as it does mainly with human behavior, the law very likely has more
to teach psychology than to learn from it. The law has had a long history and very
able students and practitioners." THorNDIE, MAN AND His WoRKS 133 (1943).
10 See note 6 supra.
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contrasted with medical functions remain insistent needs despite the
progress represented in the Guttmacher-Weihofen book.
As regards the last of these, it is sometimes recognized that insanity
and criminal responsibility are legal questions while mental disease is
a medical problem." But unless the differences are articulated and
illustrated in simple examples of medical practice and legal proceedings, misconceptions are fostered, e.g., that "legal insanity" is an
imagined disease conjured up by presumptuous lawyers. Guttmacher
and Weihofen help to clarify the meaning of the legal tests, but they
do not push their analysis far enough. "The test", they say, "is not
a fumbling and ancient attempt on the part of the law to define a
psychosis, as some psychiatric critics seem to assume. The tests attempt to isolate those offenders who, because of their mental disorder,
are nondeterrable. . . . ,12 This is hardly a satisfactory solution of a
central problem, and the restriction of objectives to deterrence is untenable. Moreover, in the writer's opinion, the tests do define psychosis
to the extent of specifying rationality 13 and focusing upon phases of
conduct which are socially and legally important. There is nothing
technical or arbitrary about that, and some psychiatrists have recognized that their studies and diagnoses should take account of such
conduct.
The legal tests have been defined by thoughtful persons, lay and
professional, aided by the best available experts, over centuries of
experience. They are stated in terms suited to the conditions, problems, and purposes of the legal process. They involve some questions
which some psychiatrists do not ask their patients, but that they are
questions which psychiatrists understand and can assist the courts
to answer is abundantly evidenced by the helpful participation of
many psychiatrists in court proceedings. 4 The Guttmacher-Weihofen
"1Keedy, IrresistibleIsnpulse as a Defenme in the Criminal Law, 100 U. oF PA. L.

REv. 993 (1952).
22P.

420.

the term insanity to-day is usually limited to persons who suffer from a
major mental disease which we [psychiatrists] know as a psychosis and who are
thereby irresponsible according to law, or certifiable as insane." EAST, op. cit. Supra
note 4 at 62.
"Irrationality is still accepted as a criterion of severe mental illness. .. .
Zilboorg, The Sense of 1eality 10 PSYCHOANAL. Q. 183, 184 (1941).
'4 "Psychiatric critics of the criminal law have often complained that the law
does not give them the opportunity to bring the science of psychiatry and psychoanalysis to bear in a criminal case. Such complaints are groundless .... The law,
therefore, not only makes possible but, as I see it, demands the scientific diagnosis
of a mental disease from the psychiatric expert. That includes the use of all modern.
13 11...

PSYCHIATBT
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book -will, of course, facilitate more systematic investigations of this
important problem
Very inadequate, however, and even misleading is the authors' discussion of the place of motive in the criminal law. "[T]he law", they
say, "is not interested in why he meant to do it." And they comment:
"To the psychologist, this is a curious notion, for he cannot conceive
of trying to understand human behavior without asking why the individual acted as he did." 15 The legal significance of motive has been
analyzed in some detail in the professional literature on criminal law,
hence the above treatment of the problem is unfortunate. "The law"
is very much interested in motive, as is shown in the initiation and
withholding of prosecution, -waiver of felonies, the admission of evidence of motive relevant to the act in issue, pre-sentence investigations
and hearings, the administration of probation, suspended sentence,
and parole laws, and elsewhere. The principal point, however, is that
the meaning of exclusion of motive from the substantive law is that
it is not relevant to the definition of a crime. The premise is that no
matter how good the motive may be, one who intentionally or recklessly
commits a harm forbidden by criminal law, commits a crime, i.e., the
definitions of crimes may not be supplanted by individual estimates,
on the basis of evaluating motives, that a crime was or was not committed. Our legal order assures the necessary minimum of objectivity
and certainty, and for the most part allocates motivation to the sphere
of administration where, whatever the final disposition, the basic
premise is not repudiated (and when psychiatrists, examining a cooperating person, can give the court substantial assistance).
One of the most helpful parts of the Guttmacher-Weihofen book is the
authors' discussion of the "partly responsible". They do not pursue
the common criticism that the law stupidly draws a sharp line between
sane and insane, although they appreciate the importance of the soundest
possible treatment of the numerous "not-sane not-insane" persons.1
methods, be they psychosomatic tests, projective tests, Rorschach test, mosaic te3t,
electroencephalograms, or psychoanalytic studies of the inner life history. The expert who is required to make a scientific diagnosis is entitled, if he is asked to substantiate it, to refer to any of these methods." Wertham, The Psychiatry of Criminal
Guilt, in SocIm MEANING OF LEGAL CONcFP s--CaimNx GmUT 163 (N. Y. U.
School of Law, 1950).
'5

. 402.

716In theory and in public opinion the hospital stands at the opposite pole from
the penitentiary; but in practice there are punitive aspects in involuntary committment in a hospital, and the more progressive penal institutions make provision for
treatment by classification, psychiatric and other medical service, and diversification
of work. "The view usually maintained by prison psychiatrists in this country, that
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The authors' discussion of the Fisher case and the rule that intoxication
may be shown to exclude premeditation and, thus, first degree murder,
is persuasive within the limited context considered. It would have been
even more significant if they had related their discussion to the objective standard of liability. The authors merely refer to that* but
account for the prevailing decisions by the fact that lawyers "have
been distracted by the tests of insantiy"''5 and that the courts fear that
juries could not discriminate between degrees of mental disorder.' 9 That
may be true but the underlying difficulty is presented by the established
rule of objective liability applied to homicide and certain other areas,
e.g., mistake of fact. This rule runs counter to the subjective liability
applied in most of the criminal law and should be wholly eliminated
from the criminal law.2 0 That would take care not only of killings by
such persons as Fisher but, also, of many other types of cases, including those involving persons who are inexperienced or conditioned
by a foreign culture, rather then mentally deficient.
In a flight from the scholarly thinking which characterizes the
greater part of their book, the authors suggest that it makes no difference whether a person who committed a crime was sane and guilty or
"not guilty by reason of insanity". "In either case", they say, "he
has shown himself a menace to society who must be taken into custody
and control. Why worry over whether that control is based on criminality
or insanity?" 2 In support of this notion, the authors espouse what
they call "the new direction" and "the new approach", which turns
out to be a sketchy version of recent criminological positivism, with the
usual humanitarian claims, the pretense to scientific support, and the
cold admission that it may, of course, be necessary to incarcerate petty
offenders for life ("even though the only crime he has actually committed was a minor one") if the psychiatrist-king decides that they
punishment may be a valuable adjunct to treatment in selected cases of criminal
behavior associated with a minor mental abnormality, appears to be gaining ground."
EAsT, op. cit. supra note 4 at 268-9.
Legal provision for the ",partly insane" ',the "not-sane not-insane" ',
implemented
by special institutions, would not alter the nature of the legal issues or the type of
decision required. For, again, for purposes of legal control, the intermediate group
would need to be distinguished at the one extrqme from the fully normal and, at the
other, from the obvious psychotics.
17

P. 426.

:S P. 430.
19 Ibid.
20 HALL, GENERAL PRINc'IPs op' CRIMINAL LAw

21 p. 443.

c. 6 (1947).
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"cannot safely be released".2 It is a pity that so good a book was
marred by such loose talk; and the authors, revealing their own doubts,
turn to a position sharply opposed to the "scientific controls". "The
point is", they say, "that the problem is a moral one." There are
dangers in unlimited control by experts.2 So much depends upon the
parents' "respect or disregard of basic moral principles' ".24Thus the
one thesis is cancelled out by the other; and the last words return to
the common sense morality embodied in the criminal law.
The most important part of the book is the authors' discussion of the
M'Naghten Rule and the "irresistible impulse" test. They aptly point
to the ambiguity of the word "wrong" in the M'Naghten' formula, but
they do not analyze the existing conflict in the decisions. 25
They give their most detailed attention to the "irresistible impulse"
test, which is again asserted to be law in at least fourteen states and,
perhaps, in four additional ones. It would have been helpful had the
authors resolved the principal doubt regarding this assertion, namely,
is the "irresistible impulse" test accepted in all those states as a sufficient alternative to the M'Naghten Rule? Unless that is clearly shown
to be the case (and not merely recognition that impulsive actions may
be evidence of irrationality, as defined in the M'Naghten Rule), the
"irresistible impulse" test has not been accepted.
The authors' support of the "irresistible impulse" test does not contribute substantially to the solution of* that very important problem.
For reasons stated above, it does not clarify the functions of judges
and juries, as distinguished from those of expert witnesses, to assert
that: "Whether a truly irresistible impulse can exist is a question for
psychiatrists rather than for judges to decide, and dogmatic judicial
denials that such a condition is possible have rather gone out of
fashion." '2 Besides, that merely assumes that psychiatry or a particular
school of psychiatry is superior to the psychology represented in the
22 p. 445.
23 p.

447.

24P. 455.

25 The problem has been revived by decisions of the English Court of Criminal
Appeal holding that "wrong" means "contrary to law." Beg. v. Windle (1952)
1 T.LR. 1344.
26 p. 409.

"It is sometimes suggested that the mental condition of an accused person should
be taken out of the hands of the jury, and that a medical referee sitting with the
presiding judge should determine the issue. I believe this suggestion is thoroughly
mischievous."

"...

an intolerable burden would be placed upon psychiatry in its
EAST, op. cit. supra note

adolescence if it had the last word in a criminal court."
4 at 17, 18.
Of. WEST, CONSCIENCE AND SocIET

103-4 (1942).
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criminal law concerning certain socially important conduct. And it
completely ignores the fact that psychiatrists are.sharply divided on
this problem and that many of them, perhaps most of them, support
the prevailing judicial estimate.2 It is all the more surprising because,
although they quote Dr. Frederic Wertham's complete rejection
of "irresistible impulse", the authors ignore his analysis and the
facts which led him to a position flatly opposed to that of the exponents
of "irresistible impulse' ,.28
Since the "irresistible impulse" test is urged as a sufficient substitute for, or alternative to, the M'Naghtcn Rude, it directly implies the
exclusion of irrationality from the criteria that a person is psychotic.
The authors advert 29 to the criticism suggested by this writer in 1945,
namely, if the various functions of the personality are integrated
(as the authors agree) 30 how can a person understand what he is doing,
realize that inflicting a serious injury on a human being is grossly immoral but, nevertheless, at the same time be so impaired in his power
to control his conduct that he is "irresistibly impelled" to commit a
major harm?:" They attempt to meet the difficulty by stating: "But
while it is true that the affective, cognitive, and conative processes of
the mind are interrelated, certain forms of mental disease may affect
one more than the others. A disorder manifesting itself in impulsive acts
may affect intelligence somewhatt, but it is quite possible that impulsiveness may have reached the point where it can be said that it is
27

HALL, op. cit. .pra note 20 at 507 n. 99, 512 n. 21, 518 n. 45 (1947), and see

note 28 infra.
Their quotation of WET HAm is THE SHoW OF VioLENCE (1949) on pp. 410-411.
In a later publication Dr. Wertham more fully explained his complete rejection
of " ' irresistible impulse":
"In my opinion the criminal law which makes use of the conception of irresistible
impulse is not an advance belonging to the present 'scientific social' era. It is a
throwback to, or rather a survival of, the previous 'philosophical psychological' era.
The concept of irresistible impulse derives from a philosophical, speculative, synthetic psychology. It forms no part of and finds no support in the modern dynamic
psychoanalytic study of mental processes." WEaTHAm, op. cit. SUpra note 14 at 164.
28

20 p. 410.
30 Pp. 14, 171, 324.

31 The authors would emphasize very strong urges rather than sudden, overwhelming, momentary "impulses", but such reformulation, apt as it is, does not alter the
problem raised above. 'When they say that certain offenders "1are the victims of
urges so strong that most normal persons could not resist them under most circumstances" (411), that seems to imply that "irresistible impulse" does not involve a
serious mental disorder. Nor is it persuasive that normal persons who did not resist
are distinguishable from psychopathic ones who could not resist on the basis of
whether the respective motivations were "external" or "internal". Ibid.
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"irresistible, and yet intelligence has not deteriorated so much as to
3' 2
obliterate knowledge of right and wrong."
Does this explanation aid solution of the problems raised by the
theory of "irresistible impulse" in relation to integrated personality?
"Emotions and will are also part of mentation", say the authors.
"Man ...functions as a totality... ."" But what are we to understand
them to mean by these sentences in the light of their assertion quoted
above? In modern psychology, integration (a theory dating from Plato's
Parmenides, and central in Aristotle) has meant the personality functioning as a unit as opposed to the operation of separate faculties. This
suggests the analogy of a compound rather than that of a mixture, a
whole or coalescence rather than an interrelation of separate parts.
How, then, is it possible for the personality to be seriously disordered
in some basic functions while others remain substantially unimpaired?
The gaps in relevant empirical knowledge trouble thoughtful judges
and lawyers and prevent their doing the kind of job they want to do.
For example, the degree and extent of mental disorder involved in alcoholic and narcotic addiction, epilepsy, pyromania, kleptomania, and
various manifestly sexual offenses such as exhibitionism raise difficult
legal problems precisely because the available empirical knowledge is
inadequate. Similar doubts concern certain types of delusion. The authors
apparently hold that the entire personality is involved in any delusion ;34 but there is other expert opinion that some paranoid conditions
indicate only eccentricity, not disease. Perhaps the theory of integration of the personality must be abandoned or drastically modified. But
the decision of legal issues cannot wait upon the advance of clinical
knowledge and the improvement of psychological theories.
The best part of a good book is that it stimulates the reader to think
about the unsolved problems which merit further study. This is not the
place to formulate a detailed program suggested by Psychiatry and the
Law. But with reference to the subject of the authors' most careful
analysis, the problem of the M'Naghten Ride, it seems to the writer that
there are three available avenues to attain sound objectives, which ought
to be explored.
(1) A great deal more should be made of "temporary insanity" than
has been done. This does not imply that lay notions of "temporary insanity" should be adopted but, instead, that abrupt lapses into psychoses
of very short duration be explained. Whatever the direction of sound
psychiatric implementation might be regarding, e.g., kleptomania, the
32

P. 410. This is also the position taken by KEEDY, op. cit. supra note 11 at 990.

wPp. 171, 14.
34 Pp. 417-418.
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point is that at the minute of taking what to normal persons is, say, a
silk handkerchief, that object is something quite different to the ldeptomaniac. Functioning in accordance with the "reality principle" is
greatly disordered at that time or, as the lawyers put it, there is no
knowledge of the nature and quality of the act.
(2) A further possible solution of present difficulties is to give the
word "know" in the M'Naghten Rule an interpretation consistent with
the prevailing view that the various psychological functions are integrated, i.e., to know that an act is morally wrong means more than merely
conventional or logical recognition of its immorality. It means that the
knowledge is permeated by feeling, that a person has assimilated the
knowledge into his self and not that, as an icy spectator or in mere
lip-service, he acknowledges that he "knew", etc. This view of knowing
in the realm of morality is supported by daily experience. It is consistent with the psychiatrist's "mechanism of identification", e.g., ability
to identify one's self with a prospective victim, as a phase of normal
functioning. The difference between knowledge of a mathematical
equation or a scientific law and moral knowledge which, as stated, includes affective tones and assimilation within the personality, is emphasized in existentialism and by some psychiatrists.3 5
If the above meaning of moral knowledge (restricted to the serious
harms dealt with in criminal cases where insanity pleas are raised) is
valid, psychiatrists who have been insistent on the adoption of the
"irresistible impulse" test as a sufficient substitute for the irrationality
required by the M'Naghten Rule should reconsider their interpretation
of the moral understanding of psychotic persons. 86 It may be added
3u The writer's proposal in this regard is discussed by CLECKLEY, THE MAS" 0r
SAMYr 495-501 (2nd ed. 1950). 'See also, WERTHAu, THE SHOW or VIOLENCE R6

(1949), and WERTHAm, op. cit. svpra note 14 at 167.
30 In Professor Xeedy's article, Irresistible Impulse as a Defense in the Criminal
Law, 100 U. OP PA. L. REv. 956, 9S9 (1952), it is reported that of 102 psychiatrists
who answered questionnaires sent them by Dr. P. Q. Roche, to the question, "Are
there cases where a person, suffering from mental derangement, knows that it is
wrong to inflict bodily harm (killing, maiming, ravishing) upon another person, but
owing to the mental derangement is incapable of controlling (resisting) the impulse
to commit such bodily harm?", 93 answered "yes", 9 "no", and 6 had no definite

opinion.
Regarding the significance of these data, the following questions arise:
1. How representative a sample of the 7500 practicing psychiatrists in this country
are the 102 who answered the questionnaire?
2. Did the questionnaire alert the recipients to the issues connected with the words
"mknows that it is wrong" etc. by referring to the view, generally accepted among
psychiatrists, that the personality is integrated?
3. Were those questioned invited to say what, as psychiatrists, they understood
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that, despite the deplorable state of the polemics on the above questions
(and we do not know to what extent psychiatrists who write on legal
problems represent their profession's views), many pychiatrists actually
proceed along the indicated lines and find neither themselves nor the
accused at any disadvantage because the M'Naghten Rule is framed in
nineteenth century words.3 7 They have grasped what every competent
lawyer knows, namely, that the old bottles can hold new wine, and they
interpret the legal words in terms of current psychiatric knowledge.
(3) The third suggestion is that the M'Naghten Rule be amended to
include and require consideration of certain impulsive actions as evidence
of irrationality. s
One might raise many other questions suggested by Psychiatry and tMe
Law and, indeed, in close reference to it, formulate a detailed program
for future research in forensic psychiatry. But the last word here must
be to congratulate Doctor Guttmacher and Professor Weihofen for an
important contribution which, one may believe, heralds an era of
fruitful collaboration between representatives of two ancient professions.
JERoZxE HALL

A Psychiatrist's Viewpoint
Here is a book that psychiatrists and lawyers have been looking for.
It is one that they have needed for a long time. It is one which doctors
who are not psychiatrists and lawmakers who are not lawyers will find
extremely valuable. It is one which faces up to a host of problems
"Cknows" to mean in the above context or to indicate what evidence supported their
opinion?
4. Was the attention of those questioned called to the opinions of psychiatrists
who flatly repudiate "irresistible impulse" as wholly unscientific See notes 27 and
28 supra.
The preparation of questionnaires and the interpretation of answers have received
considerable study in recent social science.
37 "During the debate Lord Haldane said that he never heard of the MI'Naghten rules embarrassing any judge when justice required an acquittal. Indeed,
the elasticity of the law is clear to all." " There can be no doubt, in the minds of
those who have considered in detail the medical evidence in many trials for murders,
that the urgent need of to-day is not a reform in the law regarding criminal responsibility, but an improvement in quality of our evidence as forensic psychiatrists."
EAsT, op. cit. supra note 4 at 49, 51.
"I know of no case where a man was wrongly declared legally insane or wrongly
declared legally sane in which this miscarriage of justice was later on clearly established and acknowledged, where the outcome would have been different had the legal
definition of insanity been different." WERTHA, op. cit. supra note 14 at 160.
38 This was suggested by the writer, op. cit. supra note 20 at 536-37. For relevant
English and Australian decisions, see id. at 526.
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which concern not only these professionals, but every citizen of this
country and, indeed, of every country; for these are problems of human
behavior and particularly human misbehavior.
For several thousand years the legal profession and the medical
profession have shared with the clergy and the teaching profession a
rank of special privilege. The teachers and preachers were ranged
against the lawyers and doctors in the sense that the first two professions had a positive approach and aimed at helping mankind onward
and upward, whereas lawyers and doctors traditionally took over when
human weakness or misfortune extracted an individual from the line
of progress.
For centuries there was no overlapping of the areas of competence
and responsibility. To be felonious was a clearly defined state which
was for the lawyer to deal with. To be sick, on the other hand, was an
equally definite condition which was for the doctor to handle; ignorance
was a problem for the teacher, and sin for the clergyman.
It is hard to say just when this simple, convenient arrangement began
to dissolve into a mesh of conflicts, ambiguities, and uncertainties. The
lawyers began to say that teachers should be responsible for the inculcation of ideals of social conformity. Teachers began to object to the
arbitrary prohibitions of the church. The church began to expect more
loyal support from the law and the doctors began to do some preaching
and teaching in the name of hygiene and the prevention of illness. The
clergy began to heal; the lawyers began to teach; the doctors began to
claim a better understanding of misbehavior than that of either the
lawyers or the preachers.
Where are we now? We are in a state of confusion, especially in regard
to the effective management, control and correction of "delinquency."
That there has always been aberrant behavior in the world, no one can
have any doubt, even without any attempt to agree upon a definition of
it. The general phenomenon of deviation from a mass tendency is so familiar in every day experience that it is much easier to grasp the notion of
queerness, exceptionalism, aberrance, in common sense terms than to
define it in mathematical or scientific terms. There may not be any
such thing as an average man or a normal man, but we all know what is
meant by a queer man -or
we think we do. Perhaps I should put my
emphasis on the fact that we think we do, because by various ways of
construing the definition, it might be possible to show that we are all
mistaken. But let's give ourselves the benefit of the doubt.
Now society is interested in queerness, in aberrances of behavior, only
when these become disturbing to society, i.e., to others than the doer.
Medicine, on the other hand, is traditionally concerned with aberrances
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that distress the doer himself. Medicine is oriented toward the problem
of survival, or rather threatened non-survival, the alarm signal of which
is pain. Pain is something the individual feels. The danger and pain
which aberrant behavior cause society have been of concern to medical
science only indirectly because of the secondary danger and pain implied for the individual who provokes it.
This is not to say that medical science has no social concern or that legal
science has no individual concern. The progress in public health and
preventive medicine on the one hand and the cherished legal provisions for individual civil rights on the other argue eloquently to the
contrary. But in a general way, law is socially oriented and medicine
is individually oriented.
During the past hundred years, both have expanded in previously
neglected directions, not only in practice but, what is much more important, in theory. Lawyers have come to see that the welfare of society
cannot be insured without provision for the molecular, that is to say,
individualistic approach to some cases and doctors have come to realize
that the physical and mental health of the individual cannot be insured
without broad social considerations. The result has been a rapid extension and overlapping of the two fields. Overlapping leads to conflict, or at least to antithesis, and the proper logical progress is toward
synthesis. The appearance of this book indicates that we are moving
in that direction.
This fusing of previously antagonistic views was dramatically illustrated in a recent local event, which I will describe briefly. The tenyear-old daughter in a middle-class family was threateningly molested
by a disagreeable character who, it turned out, had been up to such
mischief upon several previous occasions. When he was apprehended,
the mother of the molested girl was urged to prefer charges for a
criminal suit. This she hesitated to do until she had talked to various
legal authorities. One state official assured her that the only appropriate
treatment for such an offender was castration. The prosecuting attorney counselled her that a criminal charge, if sustained, probably
would result in a five-year sentence to prison from which the man
would be released after two years; he urged her to solicit the assistance
of psychiatrists in an effort to have the man declared dangerously insane
in order that he might be permanently detained. Psychiatrists whom
she approached declined to call him "insane" and were alarmed at the
implication that it might be their responsibility to deprive a man of his
liberty for the rest of his life unless they could certify that they had
cured him of a malignant tendency. It was decided to discuss the case,
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ostensibly as a moot trial, before a group of psychiatrists, lawyers,
judges and state officials interested in the problem.
And here was the astonishing thing: At this moot "trial," the lawyers
almost to a man took the position that the offender should be treated as
abnormal, while the psychiatrists took the position that he should
be tried as if he were normal. The lawyers didn't deny that a crime
had been committed, but preferred to see this as evidence of a sickness,
while the psychiatrists, without denying that he was abnormal, took
the position that a crime had been committed for which the state
had a prescribed penalty. Thus, while both agreed on the facts (namely,
that he was an offender, that he was dangerous, and that he was
aberrant) neither wanted to take the responsibility of dealing with him
within the limits of the existing machinery. Both sides agreed that for
his own sake and for the sake of society, the accused should be isolated,
but whereas the psychiatrists felt that the lawyers were in the better
position to effect this, the lawyers felt that the psychiatrists were in the
better position to effect it.
Our penal code was drawn up on the assumption that its regulations,
prohibitions and penalties would be taken into consideration by and
influence the decision of each and all of the individuals governed by it
who were tempted to violate the regulations. The law assumes that
certain people, otherwise normal, may be tempted to violate a prohibition
set up by society, but it stipulates that a given individual who wishes to
disregard this prohibition puts himself in jeopardy and if convicted
incurs a certain penalty. The lawyers are today strongly affected by the
realization, acquired from recent advances in our psychological knowledge, that the behavior of some individuals is not determined or even
influenced by a consideration of realities (including the reality of law
and penalty). With the excuse of ignorance of the law, say the lawyers,
we know how to deal; but with psychological incapacity to be properly
affected or influenced by the knowledge of the law, we don't know how
to deal. Tradition-bound though they may seem at times, lawyers are
keen observers. They know, without being told by psychoanalysts, that
some individuals do not act from conscious decision but on the basis
of irrational, illogical impulses and that they are not influenced before
or after by what constituted authorities threaten to do to them. This
poses a problem for legal philosophy.
The lawyers formerly solved this dilemma in one of three unsatisfactory ways: they persuaded themselves that these cases were exceptional and had to be regarded as unfortunate instances of the incompetence of social regulation to cooperate fairly or effectively with all
individuals. "The greatest good for the greatest number is bound to
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work some injustices. Punishment won't do any good and it won't do
us any good and will just cost society money and give society a false
sense of security, but what else can we do?"
A second unsatisfactory way in which lawyers attempted to solve their
dilemma was to appeal to society to allow judges a greater latitude in
respect to the sentence. The third unsatisfactory method was to say that
such individuals were not normal and did not come under the assumptions of the law in regard to rational, normal judgment; so: "Let
us turn them over to the psychiatrists, who have some special authorizations for handling such individuals."
Now the psychiatrists have their reasons for rejecting this transferred
responsibility. "We are," they say, "primarily doctors and not jailers.
We are not prepared to treat individuals, against their will, for conditions which they themselves may not want to get rid of. The authority
to detain individuals indefinitely, pending their willingness to accept
treatment and carry it through successfully, has not been clearly assigned to us, nor would we be eager to accept it if it were. As therapists we
are put in an untenable position if a patient is compelled to come to
us and compelled by us to remain our prisoner until he accepts and
successfully utilizes our therapeutic offerings. Doctors for .ten thousand years have been in the position of receiving suppliants; their patients beg for treatment, they pay of their substance for treatment. The
psychology of doctors is such that to be put into the position of attempting to compel a patient to accept their treatment and to detain
him until he does is too disturbing."
For this dilemma, a solution, which at first blush seems promising,
is for the legal authorities to take all responsibility for the detention
of such individuals and for psychiatrists to take the responsibility only
for treating them. The trouble with this solution is that in order to
accomplish it, someone has to say first of all that such an individual is
in need of such treatment; secondly, someone has to do the treating;
and thirdly, someone has to say (officially) that the treatment has
effected a change in the individual so that he is no longer a menace.
And who is to do these things? Who is to say that such a patient needs
this kind of handling instead of the standard procedure? And as to
who shall decide what kind of treatment is to be given and administer it,
it is certainly an open professional secret that we psychiatrists do not
know how to treat such patients in a curative way, or - to put it
more accurately- we do not know of any specific treatment which
can be regarded as promising what society wants. And, incidentally,
where are we to find the psychiatrists to even attempt it, or to do
research in the area? Is the national (and international) shortage of
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psychiatric personnel a secret? And, finally, after an offender has been
treated in whatever groping and uncertain ways the psychiatrist may
have attempted, what prophet wants to take the responsibility of saying
that the patient is well and may be released and will do society no
more harm?
This in simple outline form is the practical dilemma of psychiatry
and the law. The dilemma has a dozen collateral aspects or facets. There
is the problem of communication, of diagnosis, of testimony, of evidence,
of conviction, of veracity and even of philosophy. The illustration I
gave in which the lawyers seemed to have taken the part of the psychiatrists, and the psychiatrists the part of the lawyers is typical. Everyone is mixed up about it. It is scarcely a question any more of an argument between two sides. It is a matter of general confusion, and any
thoughtful group of individuals discussing the topic soon finds its
members arguing against themselves.
For example, Professor Edward De Grazia of Washington recently
published in the Columbia Law Review' a rather sharp criticism of
"the psychiatric argument for abolishment of punishment." He quotes
quite a number of us, including myself, and waxes wroth with us for
proposing that one can look at all misbehavior as an evidence of something mentally wrong with the individual. Now, as a lawyer, he looks
at "something wrong" from the standpoint of its social inacceptability,
and deplores my point of view that something wrong be looked at as an
evidence of the need for treatment. Now he and I do not really differ,
I think, if we define "treatment." As I use the word, putting a man
in jail may be the best possible treatment (or at least one step in the
treatment), but again it might not be- indeed, usually isn't. With
what he understands me to have said, he disagrees and I agree with
his disagreement. In an effort to get across to the public our position
that what any one does, even a criminal offender, is the product of
many forces which have caused an unendurable internal stress in that
man, we psychiatrists have perhaps used the word "sickness" too loosely.
And, in an effort to indicate our dissatisfaction with the effects of
pre-measured official punishment as a routine "treatment" of all
misbehaving individuals, we have given the impression, I am afraid,
that we don't believe in the propriety of punishment, ever. The word
punishment frightens us (doctors) so much that we get unrealistic
about it. If one insists on sticking his hand into steaming water, it
gets burned. If he kicks an angry dog, he gets bitten. Now he can't blame
society for having some of the attributes of boiling water and an angry
I De Grazia, Crime Wftiout Punishment: A Psychiatrico Conundrum, 52 COL. L.
0
REV. 746 (1952).
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dog, i.e., it has its characteristics and gives fair warning. Society doesn't

like to be kicked in the teeth and is certain to attempt to defend itself,
by threats of action and by action. I don't think that any psychiatrist
would deny that a twenty-five dollar penalty for running a red light
has a deterrent effect on most of us. The fact that has always impressed
us psychiatrists is that for some individuals the penalty that deters vs,
does not deter them! The mistake we have made is to give lawyers the
impression that we believe, therefore, that no penalties deter anyone
from anything.
We psychiatrists have not made it sufficiently, clear that attempting
to understand an individual whom we treat is not necessarily to condone
all the behavior of such an individual, or even to expect inevitable penalties for such behavior to be waived merely because he is in treatment.
Not all my colleagues agree with me about this. But I think we psychiatrists have sometimes put ourselves in a bad light by giving the
impression that if a man is taking treatment, he should be permitted some
offensiveness without penalty. For example, I personally will not accept
for outpatient psychotherapy a man subject to homosexual tendencies
who will not agree to eschew homosexual activities during the treatment
period. Many normal people in the world, for one reason or another,
manage to remain continent in spite of temptation, and I see nothing
unjust in expecting a person afflicted with a temptation toward an
illegal type of gratification to control his behavior and remain continent
during the period of treatment in which we attempt to relieve him of
his pathological propensities. I am willing to try to help him with his
temptations; but not with his crimes. I am willing to try to help a man
who is tempted to commit murder or arson, but I am not willing to treat
a man-as an outpatient-

who can't resist doing so. I grant that

homosexual seductions, etc. are less serious than arson or murder, but
the principle is the same.
All of this may seem to be a far cry from the review of this book in
which an outstanding psychiatrist and outstanding legal authority join
hands in providing us with a practical guide to common problems of
psychiatry and the law. But actually the dilemmas I have been describing are just what this book is about.
Doctor Guttmaeher is known to all of his colleagues as a thoughtful,
scholarly scientist, with a great deal of experience in this area. Professor Weihofen is not personally known to me, but is the author of a
book dealing with insanity and the criminal law,2 and has served in
important public responsibilities. 'What they have done is to outline,
in some nineteen chapters, a systematic joint approach to the overlap
2WEIHOFEN, INsAmiTY AS A DEFENSE IN O"lmnAI. LAW (1933).
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in their respective fields which I have been discussing. The first half
of the book is devoted to an account of the main classical categories of
mental disorder, with case illustrations of the ways in which patients
afflicted with these syndromes became involved in legal complications.
Then comes a chapter about the psychiatrist on the witness stand,
which emphasizes the difference between the information expected of a
doctor in the courtroom as compared to the type and method of communication which he supplies at a diagnostic conference. This is followed by two chapters dealing with the complicated topic of privileged
communications and the privilege against self-incrimination.
The next two chapters have to do with the question I raised above in
regard to who shall say that a person who does not believe himself to
be in need of treatment must put himself in a position to undergo
treatment even against his will, and perhaps against the will of some
of his friends and foes.
This in turn leads to three chapters on mental disorder as psychiatrically conceived and criminal behavior as legally conceived. The
views of numerous colleagues and jurists are cited. The upshot of this
section is approximately what I have said in my lengthy introduction:
we all seem to agree that our present machinery and our present procedure are far from adequate, satisfactory or proper. It is no longer
a question of law versus medicine, of one side against the other; there
is a general agreement that we are confused and groping and that
we have only begun to trust one another enough to join in discussions
and studies and proposals which will point to a more progressive, more
effective, more scientific, and more just method of dealing with those
fellow citizens of ours who have lost their way.
In their earnestness, humility, and mutual respect, Doctor Guttmacher
and Professor Weihofen have set us a magnificent example, and incidentally supplied us with a most useful book. It presents the problem, it
diseusses the existing inadequate solutions, it proposes some improvements. Perhaps its most useful effect will be to stimulate further collaboration between our professions, continued study, research and
discussion, with the net result of making this book -let us hope soon gloriously out of date.
KARL MNiWNMGE3

